Proposal: Adopt a Dynamic Cooldown Period for sUSDe Unstaking

Summary

This proposal suggests adopting a dynamic cooldown model for sUSDe unstaking, shifting away from the static 7 day requirement that has been used since launch. The proposed cooldown periods going forward are: 1 day, 3 day, 5 day and 7 day, depending on the allocation of the USDe backing assets at that time.

The backing assets of USDe have changed considerably since launch, and are generally more liquid today than they were when the portfolio was majority allocated to perpetual futures positions.

Today, perpetual futures make up just 11% of the backing of USDe, with 89% in liquid stablecoins, a large portion of which are immediately available to meet redemptions. As such, when the backing assets are allocated more to liquid stables, a 7 day cooldown is overly restrictive and not an accurate reflection of the immediate liquidity available in the backing.

Background

Looking at the backing asset breakdown at the start of 2025 - 93% of the backing was allocated to perpetual futures positions and a 7 day sUSDe cooldown was an appropriate level that matched the liquidity characteristics of the backing assets at the time.

Today, the backing assets are allocated mostly to liquid stables and lending positions that are outperforming funding rates at their current levels.

A sUSDe unstaking cooldown that adjusts based on the composition of the backing assets of USDe is likely more appropriate and reflective of the liquidity in the backing at that point in time.

Next Steps

The Risk Committee have been briefed of this proposal in advance and have spent significant time deliberating on the suitable triggers and criteria for a change in the cooldown period. The Risk Committee will post their analysis in the replies to this post, and if approved, Ethena will adjust the sUSDe cooldown period to match the current recommendation from the Risk Committee.

The Risk Committee will monitor the cooldown periods and the backing of USDe for any changes that may be warranted going forward.

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Ethena sUSDe Cooldown Reduction Analysis

Executive summary

Ethena currently applies a fixed 7-day unstaking period to sUSDe redemptions. This document analyses sUSDe unstaking dynamics and proposes a dynamic cooldown framework that sets the unstaking period each day based on available liquid backing relative to tail redemption risk. When Tier 1 assets (blue chip stablecoins and other same day liquid holdings) cover at least 1.5 times the p99 daily redemption benchmark, the cooldown is 1 day. As that coverage falls, the framework extends the window to 3 or 5 days automatically. The result is that users get the fastest possible redemption speed the protocol can safely support on any given day, rather than a fixed period calibrated to the worst case.

Applied to 799 days of history, the framework would have recommended a 1-day cooldown on roughly half of all days and a 7-day cooldown on the other half, with several intermediate states occurring in the second half of the observed period. The chart below shows this historical cooldown recommendation (including the queue pressure) alongside the distribution of tier 1, 2 and 3 and the coverage ratio that drives it. The two regimes are clearly visible with an early period where thin liquid backing required the full 7-day window, and a more recent period where a substantially larger and better structured Tier 1 supports same day redemptions. As of 10 March 2026 the framework recommends a 1-day cooldown, with Tier 1 coverage at 7.72x against the 1.5x threshold, the strongest position on record under the revised tier classification.



Background research

The analysis documented here is the third iteration of Blockworks Advisory’s work on sUSDe redemption design. The first analysis, conducted in early 2026, set out to answer a specific question, which is could Ethena safely shorten the sUSDe cooldown period from 7 days to 3 days without creating unacceptable liquidity risk? The answer was not a straightforward yes or no since neither a 7-day nor a 3-day fixed cooldown was the right instrument and the question itself pointed toward a different kind of framework.

The first analysis ran a counterfactual simulation imposing a 3-day cooldown on the observed history of unstake requests. Mechanically shortening the queue produced a mixed picture. Peak queue stocks fell by 12.4%, which is operationally attractive, but the tail of daily outflows widened slightly. The p99 one day outflow rose from 8.10% to 8.23% of supply, and the largest single day redemption event grew from 28.9% to 37.4% of supply due to timing effects. Large request batches that happened to mature three days before low inflow days produced outsized spikes that would not have appeared under the 7-day regime. The directional message was shortening the cooldown concentrates outflows, and the concentration is not trivial at the tail even if modest in expectation.

The more revealing finding came from the coverage analysis. Mapping USDe’s liquid backing against the 1.5x safety adjusted p99 redemption benchmarks, the protocol met the 3-day threshold on exactly zero of the 752 days in the sample. The modal recommendation under the original framework was a 7-day cooldown, required on 55.5% of days. The 3-day coverage ratio averaged 1.48x across the sample but with a median of only 0.89x, meaning on a typical day the protocol held less liquid backing than the threshold demands. That distribution is a sign of a system whose liquidity position moves enough, and fast enough, that the right cooldown length on any given day depends entirely on conditions that day.

This conclusion was reinforced by two other findings. First, the framework recorded 163 regime changes over the 752-day window, moments where the recommended cooldown switched from one length to another. Any static policy choice would have been misaligned with actual risk capacity on a large fraction of days. Second, the October 2025 stress episode, rather than being the point at which the system looked weakest, was actually the point at which coverage ratios looked strongest. During the 10-11 October window, 3-day coverage averaged 2.43x which is well above the 1.47x average in normal periods. The system appears to have mobilized liquid backing in response to pressure, a pattern consistent with precautionary rebalancing ahead of anticipated redemptions.

The regression analysis in the first report identified the sUSDe/USDe market premium as the dominant driver of deposit flows, explaining approximately 68% of net deposit variation. A 10 percentage point compression in the premium is associated historically with roughly $2.5 billion in outflows. By contrast, loop carry had no statistically significant direct effect on flows once the basis was controlled for. This has a direct implication for cooldown design where redemption pressure is not primarily a function of queue mechanics or carry arithmetic. It is primarily a function of whether the secondary market continues to price sUSDe at a premium to USDe. When that premium compresses sharply, the protocol needs to respond to large and rapid outflows regardless of what the cooldown setting is.

Taken together, these findings motivated moving from a static policy to a dynamic one. The framework that followed built on this conclusion directly. It condensed the classification of liquid stable backing from four settlement buckets to three tiers defined by redemption speed, with Tier 1 for same day liquid assets (blue-chip stables, mint/redeem balances, and USDtb in full at that stage), Tier 2 for assets redeemable within two days, and Tier 3 for utilisation constrained lending positions and ran the dynamic cooldown logic against 752 days of history. Two structural features of the system became clear. First, the cooldown distribution is strongly bimodal where 51.4% of days support a 1-day cooldown, 48.0% require the full 7-day window and only 0.7% fall in between. There is almost no middle ground. Second, this bimodal pattern is governed primarily by the share of Tier 1 in liquid backing. When Tier 1 falls below roughly 35% of the liquid pool the system drops into the low liquidity regime. When it holds above 50% the system sits comfortably in the high liquidity regime. The framework identified a Tier 1 target range of 45-55% as the structural requirement for consistent sub 3-day cooldowns, and the forecast scenarios confirmed that maintaining that allocation was more important than supply growth assumptions in determining tail outcomes. Nine regime transitions were recorded over the 752-day window which is a much smaller number than the regime change count in the original analysis, reflecting the cleaner three tier classification and a longer minimum holding period before a regime switch is confirmed.

The Risk Committee reviewed the framework and raised four specific questions that the current analysis addresses. The most substantive was the treatment of USDtb. The framework had classified the full USDtb balance in Tier 1 on the basis of two available redemption pathways, but the committee challenged whether both pathways actually generated net liquidity for the backing portfolio. That review led to the USDtb reclassification documented here, where only the 1% Anchorage instant cash buffer qualifies as Tier 1 and the remaining 99% moves to Tier 2 given the banking hours constraint on BUIDL replenishment. The committee also asked for 1-day coverage to be added as an explicit monitoring metric alongside the existing 3-day and 7-day horizons, for a queue pressure module that responds to actual unstaking activity rather than coverage alone, and for a concrete estimate of how many days the protocol can sustain a 1-day cooldown under different intensities of sustained outflow pressure. Those four additions are what this document describes.

Cooldown framework

This report documents four specific updates to the Ethena sUSDe dynamic cooldown framework, made in response to feedback from the Risk Committee. The original framework covered January 2024 through February 2026 and built a tier based liquidity classification system to recommend real time cooldown periods based on how much liquid backing was available at any given moment. The updates added (i) 1-day coverage as a monitoring metric alongside the existing 3-day and 7-day horizons, (ii) a queue pressure monitoring module that reacts to actual unstaking activity, (iii) a clearer treatment of how USDtb redemptions work and what that means for how we classify it and (iv) a stress testing that calculates how long the protocol can hold a 1-day cooldown under different intensities of sustained outflow pressure.

Where things stand right now, as of 10 March 2026, the protocol is in a strong liquidity position. 3-day coverage sits at 5.21x, 1-day coverage at 7.72x, and the framework recommends a 1-day cooldown. Total usable liquid backing is $5 billion against a USDe circulating supply of $5.93 billion, with $2.82 billion in Tier 1 assets available for same day redemptions. In practical terms, the protocol could absorb up to $1.88 billion of daily outflows (about 31.7% of supply) before needing to extend the cooldown. Under sustained p99 redemption pressure, Tier 1 holds for 11 consecutive days at normal stress intensity, 7 days at 1.5x that level, and 6 days at double intensity.

The framework sorts all liquid backing into three buckets based on how quickly each asset can actually be converted into stablecoins to meet redemptions, the tier composition is as discussed in the framework. Coverage ratios compare available liquidity against the p99 historical redemption benchmarks. Those benchmarks are 4.1% of USDe supply for the 1-day horizon, 9.2% for 3 days, and 12.0% for 7 days. We apply a 1.5x safety cushion throughout, so a 1-day cooldown requires Tier 1 to cover at least 1.5 times the p99 1-day benchmark, not just meet it exactly.

Asset Tier Settlement Rationale
USDC, USDT, PYUSD (exchange/custody) 1 Same day Blue chip stables, instantly accessible
Mint/redeem contract balance 1 Same day Already in protocol facility
USDtb (Anchorage instant buffer, 1%) 1 15 min, 24/7 $5-10M fiat buffer, no banking hours dependence
sDAI, sUSDS (yield bearing stables) 2 <2 days Redeemable but not instant
Lending positions, withdrawable portion 2 <2 days Confirmed withdrawable against current utilisation
USDtb BUIDL/Anchorage remainder (99%) 2 <2 day (banking hours) app.40h/week replenishment constraint
Lending positions, utilisation constrained 3 <5 day Withdrawal depends on pool utilisation dropping first

The original coverage plot only showed 3-day and 7-day coverage. We added the 1-day coverage ratio to the plot. Under the revised tier classification, 1-day coverage is no longer systematically higher than 3-day coverage. Coverage 1d reflects Tier 1 only, while coverage 3d includes Tier 1 and Tier 2 combined, so when Tier 2 is large relative to Tier 1 (as it now is with most USDtb reclassified), the 3-day line can sit above the 1-day line depending on the relative size of Tier 2. The meaningful signal is whether 1-day coverage is above or below 1.5x, not its absolute level relative to the other lines.

Metric Coverage 1d Coverage 3d Coverage 7d
Mean 1.93x 1.94x 1.58x
Median 1.04x 1.66x 1.27x
5th Percentile 0.30x 0.14x 0.10x
95th Percentile 5.58x 4.45x 3.55x
Minimum 0.00x 0.00x 0.00x
Maximum 7.72x 5.21x 4.73x
Current (10 March 2026) 7.72x 5.21x 4.73x

The existing framework makes its cooldown recommendation based purely on how much liquid backing is available at that moment. The committee wanted something that also responds to what is actually happening in the redemption queue, specifically, is unstaking activity accelerating in a way that suggests a stress event is building? The design had to satisfy three conditions: only increase cooldowns when redemptions are actively materialising, avoid triggering so frequently that users experience constant cooldown changes and escalate immediately and decisively when something genuinely extreme happens.

We compute a queue pressure ratio, today’s unstaking requests divided by the 14-day rolling average. If that ratio exceeds 2.0x (meaning today is seeing double the recent run rate) and the 3-day coverage ratio is below 1.5x at the same time, the cooldown recommendation gets bumped up by one day. If two or more consecutive days unstaking breach the historical p95 level of daily outflows, the cooldown jumps straight to 3 days regardless of coverage, that is the hard escalation trigger. The histogram below shows the shape of the daily pressure ratio distribution across the full sample. The vast majority of days cluster near zero, the protocol experiences normal or below average unstaking on most days. The distribution has a pronounced right tail, however, with a p95 of 5.42x and a maximum of 20.0x, confirming that extreme pressure events do materialise and are fat tailed. Surge days (ratio above 2.0x) accounted for 127 observations, or 15.9% of the sample (roughly one in six days) while the p95 hard escalation threshold was breached in 10 days (1.3%).

The committee had questions about whether USDtb really belongs in Tier 1. The concern was whether the reliance on Anchorage Digital Bank as issuer and custodian introduces enough friction to downgrade its settlement speed. After reviewing the documented redemption architecture, the conclusion is that only the Anchorage instant cash buffer (1% of USDtb supply) qualifies as Tier 1 and the remainder is classified as Tier 2 given the banking hours constraint of BUIDL replenishment.

The atomic swap path is available 24/7 to all Ethena onboarded mint/redeemers. It works in two atomic transactions using USDtb to mint USDe (one Ethereum block, roughly 12 seconds), then redeem USDe for USDC or USDT (another block). Total round trip under 24 seconds, 4 basis points all in, no Anchorage account required. This path applies to external holders of USDtb where the USDtb is held outside of the USDe backing. For USDtb already held as USDe collateral, the same transaction would be circular and does not generate net liquidity.

The Anchorage fiat path is for users with Anchorage accounts and works as follows: deposit USDtb with Anchorage (instant credit), receive fiat USD within 15 minutes, 24/7/365. A 1% cash buffer (approximately $10 million at $800 million supply) is held for continuous same day availability, with larger amounts replenishable from BUIDL redemptions within hours on US banking days (executable app. 40 hours per week).

The $10 million Anchorage instant cash buffer qualifies as Tier 1 on the basis of 24/7 availability. The remainder of the USDtb balance is classified as Tier 2, given that replenishment above the buffer required BUIDL redemption during US banking hours.

The redemption cap analysis is the most practically useful addition. It converts the abstract coverage ratios into a concrete operational question, if outflows come in at p99 intensity and do not stop, how many days of Tier 1 runway do we have before the coverage threshold is breached and we need to extend the cooldown? This is the number the operations team actually needs to plan around.

We estimated the daily redemption cap as the maximum daily outflow Tier 1 can absorb while still staying above the 1.5x threshold (Tier 1/ 1.5). Across the full 799 day sample, the mean daily redemption cap is $514.4 million, or 7.9% of supply. That average is pulled down substantially by Phase 1, when Tier 1 was minimal. At the October 2025 peak the cap reached $2.7 billion. Today it sits at $1.88 billion, equivalent to 31.7% of supply, meaning the protocol can currently absorb an outflow event approximately 2.6 times the size of the largest single day unstaking observed in the historical data (approximately $714 million) before needing to consider a cooldown extension.

Metric Value
Mean daily redemption cap $514.4M (7.90% of supply)
Minimum daily cap $0.0M (early Phase 1)
Maximum daily cap $2,702.7M (October 2025 peak)
Current cap (10 March 2026) $1,876.5M (31.65% of supply)
Current cap vs largest single day outflow 2.6x larger

The stress endurance simulation takes this further. Starting from each historical date, it progressively drains Tier 1 by a fixed daily amount (calibrated at 1x, 1.5x, or 2x the p99 1-day benchmark) and counts how many days pass before coverage falls below the safety floor. The simulation caps at 365 days. Three shock levels are tested, normal stress (4.1% of supply per day), elevated stress (6.15%), and severe stress (8.2%). The result is a time varying estimate of protocol endurance that moves with Tier 1 balances.

Right now, if the protocol were hit by continuous p99 level redemption pressure (roughly 4.1% of supply per day, every day) Tier 1 would hold the 1-day cooldown threshold for 11 consecutive days before an extension became necessary. Pump that pressure up to 1.5x p99 and the runway shortens to 7 days. At double p99 intensity, it is 6 days.

Stress Scenario Daily Drain Mean Endurance Median Endurance 5th Pct Current Runway
Normal (1x p99) 4.1% of supply/day 1.4 days 0 days 0 days 11 days
Elevated (1.5x p99) 6.15% of supply/day 0.9 days 0 days 0 days 7 days
Severe(2x p99) 8.2% of supply/day 0.6 days 0 days 0 days 6 days

The historical mean endurance of 1.4 days at normal intensity mostly reflects Phase 1, when Tier 1 was already below the threshold on many days and endurance started at zero. Phase 3 tells a much better story with the October 2025 stress episode (the most significant historical reference point) produced an average endurance of 4.6 days at 1x p99 intensity, meaning even during that stress episode the protocol had nearly a week of runway before a cooldown extension would have been required. The current 11-day endurance is the strongest position observed under the revised Tier 1 classification.

The 5th percentile of 0 days across all scenarios is worth explaining since those are Phase 1 observations where Tier 1 was already below the coverage threshold on the observation date, so the endurance was zero by definition before any additional stress was even applied.

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Summary

LlamaRisk, as a member of the Ethena Risk Committee, supports the governance proposal to adopt a dynamic sUSDe unstaking cooldown mechanism. This report presents our independent analysis of the proposal, drawing on on-chain data and the liquidity framework refined together with Blockworks Research and Kairos Research. The evidence demonstrates that a dynamic cooldown, supervised by the risk committee with clearly defined escalation criteria, is a sound improvement over the current fixed 7-day period, not only upgrading user experience but also expected to reinforce sUSDe secondary market stability properties.

Ethena’s Liquid Buffer

Ethena holds backing assets across onchain and custody wallets on Ethereum mainnet and several L2 networks (Base, Mantle, Plasma). These assets serve as the liquid buffer that absorbs redemption demand when users unstake sUSDe or redeem USDe directly through the EthenaMinting contract. As of March 12 2026, the total on-chain observable buffer stands at approximately $4.14B against a USDe supply of 5.9B with 3.51B staked into sUSDe.

Blockworks classified these assets into three tiers based on settlement speed. Tier 1 assets (USDC, USDT, USDtb, PYUSD) can be settled within one day and represent the most immediately available liquidity. Tier 2 assets (Aave aTokens such as aUSDC, aUSDT, aUSDtb, aPYUSD, along with sDAI and sUSDS) are constrained within the utilization and may require up to two days to withdraw from lending protocols. Tier 3 assets (Morpho vaults) are subject to utilization constraints and may require up to five days to fully exit.


Source: LlamaRisk, March 13, 2026

The following table summarises the current on-chain holdings across all tracked chains.

Ethereum Mainnet

Token Balance Tier Settlement
USDC $1,495.3M 1 1-day
PYUSD $1,126.6M 1 1-day
USDtb $517.3M 1/2 1% instant / 99% banking hours
aUSDtb $196.2M 2 2-day
USDT $152.5M 1 1-day
aPYUSD $103.1M 2 2-day
aUSDT $90.3M 2 2-day
SENTORAPYUSDCOREV2 $49.9M 3 5-day
STEAKUSDTBETHENA $49.2M 3 5-day
aUSDC, sUSDS, STEAKUSDCETHENA < $1M each 2/3 2–5 day
Ethereum subtotal $3,780.3M

L2 Deployments

Chain Token Balance Tier
Plasma APLAUSDT0 $645.5M 2
Mantle aManUSDT0 $248.1M 2
Base STEAKPRIMEUSDC $213.7M 3
L2 subtotal $1,107.4M

Tier-Level Summary

Tier Settlement Current Balance Share
Tier 1 1-day $2.78B 57%
Tier 2 2-day $1.80B 37%
Tier 3 5-day $0.31B 6%
Total $4.89B

USDtb occupies a special position in this classification. While it is a stablecoin, its redemption depends on banking hours for the underlying T-bill settlement. Accordingly, 1% of USDtb holdings are classified as Tier 1 (representing the 24/7 instant buffer maintained by the issuer) and the remaining 99% as Tier 2.

It is important to note that the on-chain buffer represents only the observable portion of Ethena’s liquidity. Additional reserves are held within custodian accounts (Coinbase, Anchorage, Kraken), generally in USDT form, which are not captured by on-chain balance queries. The figures presented here therefore represent a conservative lower bound.

Buffer Resilience Under Pressure

The liquid buffer must absorb two types of outflow: sUSDe unstaking (users exiting the StakedUSDeV2 vault) and direct USDe redemptions through the EthenaMinting contract. Over the observation period, the protocol processed $10.3B in unstaking volume across 22,456 events and $14.6B in direct redemptions across 11,702 events. Combined, these represent the total demand-side pressure on Ethena’s reserves.

Queue pressure measures the intensity of outflow relative to recent history. It is defined as the ratio of daily combined outflow to the 14-day rolling average.

$$
QP(t) = \frac{\sum (\text{unstaking} + \text{redemptions}) \text{ in } [t - 24h, t]}{\text{avg of 14 non-overlapping 24h windows before } [t-24h]}
$$

A queue pressure of 0.5-1.0x indicates normal activity (unstaking and redemption pressure mild or in a declining phase); values above 2.0x indicate outflow is running at double the recent baseline, and values above 5.0x represent extreme tail events. Over the full period, median queue pressure was 0.51x (indicating that most days see below-average outflow). The 95th percentile reached 4.01x, the 99th percentile 8.86x, and the historical maximum 13.49x. Days with queue pressure exceeding 2.0x occurred 11.8% of the time (72 days), and days exceeding 5.0x occurred 3.3% of the time (20 days).


Source: LlamaRisk, March 13, 2026

The single largest daily outflow was $1,705M on 11 October 2025.


Source: LlamaRisk, March 13, 2026

Coverage adequacy ratios evaluate whether the buffer can absorb historically severe redemption demand. Blockworks derived P99 benchmarks by computing the 99th percentile of cumulative net USDe redemptions observed over rolling 1-day, 3-day, and 7-day windows across the protocol’s history. These benchmarks (4.1% of supply for the 1-day horizon, 9.2% for 3-day, and 12.0% for 7-day) represent near-worst-case outflow scenarios: only 1% of historical periods saw higher redemption pressure. Each coverage ratio is then calculated as the available liquidity at the corresponding tier divided by the product of current USDe supply and the P99 benchmark. For example, 1-day coverage equals Tier 1 balance / (supply x 4.1%). A ratio above 1.0x means the buffer exceeds the P99 demand level; We recommend maintaining at least a 1.5x safety threshold.

Over the full observation period, 1-day coverage averaged 2.80x with a median of 2.78x. The current value is 8.40x. 7-day coverage averaged 2.91x with a median of 3.32x and currently stands at 6.88x. The coverage ratios have trended sharply upward since mid-2025 as Ethena diversified its backing composition and grew the liquid buffer. The current values represent the most comfortable liquidity position in the protocol’s history.


Source: LlamaRisk, March 13, 2026

Secondary Market Efficiency and the 7-Day Cooldown

The current fixed 7-day cooldown creates a structural friction for users seeking to exit their sUSDe position. Rather than waiting the full cooldown period, users who need immediate liquidity sell sUSDe on secondary markets (primarily Curve and other DEX pools). This selling pressure periodically pushes the sUSDe market price below its fair value, creating a discount that arbitrageurs must bridge.

Fair value is computed as the sUSDe/USDe exchange rate multiplied by the USDe/USD price. Over the observation period of 607 daily observations, sUSDe traded at a mean deviation of -0.168% from fair value. The maximum discount reached -1.270% and the maximum premium +0.079%. Overall, sUSDe traded at a discount on 91.9% of observed days (558 days) and at a premium on only 8.1% (49 days). This persistent discount is a direct consequence of the 7-day cooldown: it represents the cost that impatient sellers pay to bypass the waiting period.


Source: LlamaRisk, March 13, 2026

A shorter cooldown narrows the arbitrage window. When the cooldown is 1 day instead of 7 days, arbitrageurs can buy discounted sUSDe, initiate unstaking, and receive USDe within 24 hours rather than a week. This compresses the maximum discount the market can expect, improving price efficiency for all holders. The 7-day cost of capital that currently anchors the discount floor would shrink to a 1-day cost, reducing the structural discount by roughly 6/7ths in equilibrium (even if we can still expect the heavy discount tails during stress events).

Ethena has not actively incentivized sUSDe DEX liquidity in recent months. As a result, the majority of exit volume flows through the direct unstaking path. A dynamic cooldown that reflects actual backing liquidity would align the unstaking friction with the protocol’s ability to process redemptions, rather than imposing a fixed delay regardless of conditions.

Technical Mechanics of sUSDe Unstaking

The sUSDe unstaking flow involves three contracts: StakedUSDeV2 (the main ERC4626 vault), USDeSilo (the escrow contract), and USDe (the underlying ERC20 stablecoin). The process follows a precise sequence of steps.

  1. The user calls cooldownShares(shares) on the StakedUSDeV2 contract.
  2. The sUSDe shares are burned immediately at the current exchange rate (totalAssets / totalSupply).
  3. The equivalent USDe amount, calculated via previewRedeem(), is transferred from the vault to the USDeSilo escrow contract.
  4. A cooldown timer is initiated: cooldownEnd is set to block.timestamp + cooldownDuration.
  5. After the cooldown period has elapsed, the user calls unstake(receiver) to claim.
  6. The USDeSilo transfers the locked USDe to the specified receiver address.

Several aspects of this design are relevant to the dynamic cooldown proposal. First, the user earns no yield during the cooldown period. Since the sUSDe shares are burned at step 2, the user’s capital sits idle as USDe in the Silo. The yield that would have accrued on those shares is instead distributed to remaining stakers, creating a modest yield forfeiture penalty for unstakers. Second, there is no time limit to claim after cooldown expiry; the user may call unstake at any point after cooldownEnd. Third, if a user calls cooldownShares again before claiming, the timer resets to a new cooldownEnd and the amounts accumulate, penalizing users that start new cooldowns before the previous amount is claimed.

Critically for the dynamic cooldown proposal, users who have already initiated unstaking when the global cooldownDuration changes are not affected. The cooldownEnd timestamp is fixed at initiation time. If the protocol shortens the cooldown from 7 days to 1 day, existing users in the queue still proceed with their original 7-day period. Conversely, if the cooldown is lengthened, only new initiations are subject to the longer duration.

The yield distribution mechanism provides an additional safeguard against arbitrage under shorter cooldowns. Ethena distributes rewards via transferInRewards() on the StakedUSDeV2 contract approximately every 8 hours. Each distribution triggers a linear vesting period of 8 hours (the VESTING_PERIOD constant), during which the exchange rate rises gradually rather than in a discrete step. On-chain analysis of the past year of RewardsReceived events confirms this cadence: 1,098 distributions were observed over 367 days, with a median gap of exactly 8.0 hours between consecutive events. The average distribution size was approximately 189,127 USDe, and the implied annualized yield from these distributions is approximately 5.8%.

Source: LlamaRisk, March 13, 2026

Source: LlamaRisk, March 13, 2026

Even with a 1-day cooldown, the 8-hour vesting eliminates the viability of arbitrage or front-running strategies: a user staking immediately before a distribution would need to wait at least 1 day, during which only approximately 3 distributions vest. The yield from those 3 distributions (roughly 1/365th of the annual yield, or approximately 0.016% at current rates) would naturally disallow the user from receiving distributions that would represent rewards held for a longer time than the user would have held the deposits for.

Conclusion

LlamaRisk supports the proposal to adopt a dynamic sUSDe unstaking cooldown. The analysis presented in this report demonstrates that Ethena’s liquid buffer has consistently maintained coverage ratios well above the safety thresholds established by Blockworks Research, and that the yield distribution mechanics provide natural protection against arbitrage even at the shortest cooldown durations.

The unstaking cooldown will be supervised by the risk committee, using the framework co-developed together with Blockworks Research and Kairos Research as the reference for decision-making. The committee will monitor backing composition, coverage adequacy ratios, and queue pressure to determine the appropriate cooldown level at any given time.

The most important principle guiding the committee’s oversight is predictability. The cooldown should not change in a volatile or erratic manner. Users and integrators need to have reasonable expectations about the unstaking timeline, and frequent oscillations would undermine confidence in the mechanism.

Short cooldowns are appropriate when the backing is predominantly composed of liquid stablecoins and coverage ratios are comfortably above the safety thresholds. Longer cooldowns are warranted when the portfolio shifts toward less liquid positions, when coverage ratios approach or fall below critical levels, or when queue pressure indicates sustained abnormal outflow demand. The dynamic mechanism ensures that the unstaking friction imposed on users is proportional to the actual conditions of the protocol rather than a fixed constant that ignores the state of the backing.

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Kairos Research supports this proposal. The analysis is thorough and the core framework is sound, a dynamic cooldown tied to Tier 1 coverage is the right approach, and the data clearly shows that any static period (whether 3 or 7 days) would be inefficient on a large fraction of days.

A few points worth flagging:

The revised USDtb classification is the right call. Reclassifying the 99% BUIDL-backed portion to Tier 2 makes sense given the banking hours constraint on replenishment. The atomic swap pathway is fast but circular for USDtb already held as USDe collateral as it routes through the same stablecoin pool that sUSDe unstakers draw from. Only the ~$10M Anchorage fiat buffer is genuinely independent 24/7 liquidity.

Competing demands on Tier 1 deserve monitoring. sUSDe unstaking and USDtb atomic swaps both draw from the same liquid stablecoin pool with no replenishment mechanism outside US banking hours. The framework should account for these overlapping claims when calibrating the trigger thresholds.

We would also suggest exploring an express unstake mechanism as a complement. A fee-based option for users who need faster liquidity during extended cooldown periods would generate revenue during stress, provide a real-time signal of redemption urgency, and reduce queue pressure for standard-path users without weakening the cooldown framework itself.

Overall Kairos Research is supportive and we look forward to continued monitoring of the protocol’s liquidity. Thanks to our colleagues from Blockworks and Llama Risk on all the work here!

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